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The aim of this paper is to illustrate some of the complexities involved in modelling the 
incentive effects of taxes and transfers, using only basic diagrammatic methods. It 
describes a range of diagrams which are helpful in thinking about the design of tax and 
transfer systems and their potential effects on labour supply behaviour. Emphasis is given 
to the role of highly nonlinear budget constraints and the resulting wide range of labour 
supply responses. 
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Labour Supply Incentives in 
Alternative Tax and Transfer 
Schemes: A Diagrammatic 
Introduction 
1 Introduction 
The aim of paper is to discuss some of the complexities involved in modelling the 
incentive effects of taxes and transfers, using only basic diagrammatic methods of 
analysis. Tax and transfer systems in most countries are highly complex, consisting of a 
wide range of benefit payments, each with its own set of withdrawal rates and thresholds. 
Often the different components are not well integrated, so that unplanned effects can 
arise, especially where piecemeal adjustments to benefit levels and income thresholds are 
made over a period of time. Policy reforms are typically concerned with balancing the 
aims of providing income support with the desire to avoid excessive disincentive effects of 
taxes. In designing reforms, it is useful to have in mind a number of relationships which 
can conveniently be discussed in diagrammatic terms.  
This paper therefore explores a range of diagrams which are helpful in thinking about the 
design of tax and transfer systems and their potential effects on labour supply behaviour. 
Emphasis is given to the role of nonlinear budget constraints and the resulting wide range 
of labour supply responses. The analysis of labour supply in the presence of nonlinear 
budget constraints rapidly becomes complicated; the aim here is to steer a path between 
oversimplified text book treatments and highly technical research papers.
1  
The use of diagrams relating gross and net incomes, for specified groups, is described in 
Section 2. Section 3 introduces budget constraints and utility maximisation in a very 
simple labour supply framework. The general implications of piecewise linear budget 
constraints are discussed in Section 4. The effect of a non-recoverable cost of applying 
for benefits and its joint effect on take-up and labour supply are briefly examined in 
Section 5. Brief conclusions are in Section 6.  
                                                                 
1For more technical treatments and further references see, for example, Creedy (1996, 2001).  




2  Net and gross incomes 
Tax and transfer systems are typically specified in terms of a set of gross income 
thresholds and associated marginal tax, or benefit withdrawal (sometimes called ‘taper’), 
rates applying above the thresholds. Such rates and thresholds generally refer to a 
particular type of individual or household, depending on its composition. For this reason a 
popular way of illustrating the nature of the system is to use a diagram with gross income, 
from all non-benefit sources, on the horizontal axis and net income on the vertical axis, as 
in Figure 1. 


























Figure 2 – A basic income - flat tax 
 
This type of diagram has the advantage that it displays the tax thresholds and rates 
clearly and applies to all those in the specified demographic group. Along the 45
o  line, net 
and gross incomes are equal. Figure 1 also shows a simple proportional income tax 
applied to all income at the rate t. The vertical distance between the tax schedule and the 
45
o  line, at any gross income level, shows the amount of tax paid, ty, and the vertical 
height of the schedule shows net income, ( ) 1 ty − . The slope of the line therefore 
measures the proportion of each $ retained after tax, that is ( ) 1 t − .  
2.1  A basic income – flat tax 
Figure 2 combines the proportional income tax with an unconditional transfer payment 
equal to B. Hence the relationship between gross and net income is shifted up by an 
amount, B, at all points. This is the simplest possible tax and transfer system imaginable; 
it is referred to as a basic income - flat tax, or BI/FT, scheme. This system, despite its 
simplicity, nevertheless gives rise to many complexities. It has been referred to by several 
other names, including negative income tax (NIT), social dividend, and linear tax scheme.  
The figure shows immediately the ‘break-even’ income level,  B y , where net and gross 
income are equal; all those below  B y  receive a net gain. The BI/FT need not necessarily 
be administered as an unconditional benefit combined with a proportional tax. It may 
involve an integrated system in which those below  B y  pay no tax and receive the vertical 
distance between the tax schedule and the 45
o  line, while those above the break-even 
point only pay tax, determined as a fixed proportion of income measured in excess of  B y , 























This comparison shows that the measurement of ‘total expenditure’ and ‘total taxation’ in a 
tax/transfer system is rather arbitrary; gross expenditure may be very high (in this case it 
is  nB, where n  is the number of people), while total expenditure less total taxation may 
be negligible. Nevertheless, critics of the BI/FT scheme argue that it requires a high value 
of t relative to existing income tax rates (though not benefit withdrawal rates). There are 
two policy instruments, B  and t, but they cannot be chosen independently because of 
the existence of a government budget constraint; for example, given the choice of B, t is 
determined by the budget constraint. In a ‘pure transfer’ system, where all tax revenue is 
redistributed in transfer payments, the tax rate is simply tB y = /,  or the ratio of the social 
dividend to arithmetic mean income. Hence the break-even point is the arithmetic mean, 
B yy =.  
Figure 3 –  Marginal and average tax rates 
 
A generous BI/FT scheme therefore appears to require a relatively high marginal tax rate, 
t, but it should be remembered that the average tax rate (ATR) is less than the marginal 
tax rate (MTR) for all individuals, and is negative for all those below  B y . The marginal and 
average rate schedules are shown in Figure 3.  
This demonstrates that considerable redistribution can be achieved with a tax system 
having a constant, rather than increasing, marginal rate structure. A progressive tax 
structure requires only an increasing average tax rate at all income levels. Indeed, in the 
limit such a system can achieve complete equality if  1 t =  and B y = . Indeed, with a 
positively skewed gross income distribution, this would be brought about by a system of 
majority voting over taxation, since all those (the majority) with  yy <  unambiguously 
favour  1 t =  while all those with  yy ≥  favour  0 t = . Of course, this type of argument has 
implicitly made the clearly false assumption that gross incomes are unaffected by the tax 













redistribution (even the amount desired by a policy-maker with a high degree of inequality 
aversion) and majority voting is considerably complicated.
2 This raises the ‘trade-off’ 
between ‘equity and efficiency’ that cannot be avoided when labour supply effects exist. 
Figure 4 – A tax-free threshold 
 
Many income tax structures have a tax-free area, and Figure 4 shows an income tax 
structure of this kind, where taxation above the threshold, a,  is equal to  () ty a − . The tax 
schedule thus follows the 45 degree line from the origin until A, and is then AB. However, 
if AB is extended to the left, it hits the vertical axis at a net income of at. This 
demonstrates that, for taxpayers (for whom  ya > ), the tax-free threshold system is 
equivalent to a BI/FT scheme. An increase in the threshold takes a few individuals out of 
the tax ‘net’ but provides an increase in the effective basic income for all taxpayers. This 
result is quite general. Any multi-rate income tax structure, even in the absence of a tax-
free area, looks, for those above the first tax rate, like a single rate structure with a tax-
free threshold (which can be expressed as a function of the earlier rates and thresholds). 
2.2 Means-tested  benefits 
Typically, tax and transfer systems have a degree of means-testing whereby benefits are 
withdrawn as individuals obtain higher gross incomes. A typical system is shown in Figure 
5, where the tax schedule ABCD has a range AB where there is a benefit taper, or 
withdrawal rate, and a further range CD where the marginal income tax rate is increased. 
However, the highest marginal effective tax rate is faced by the lowest income recipients, 
as is evident from the lower gradient of the section AB of the tax schedule. The loss of a 
degree of freedom in policy choices as a result of the government’s budget constraint has 
already been mentioned. In the means-tested system of Figure 5, a further degree of 
                                                                 
2This is partly because individuals’ preferences over the tax rate are no longer ‘single-peaked’. That is, they do not unambiguously 
























freedom is lost because of the need to avoid a discontinuity, particularly at the point B. 
Such a discontinuity would produce a sudden drop in net income, or large increase, for a 
small increase in gross income. The means-testing thresholds and rates must be set 
alongside those of the income tax system, to avoid discontinuities. However, in practice, 
because various benefits are planned independently and thresholds are often adjusted 
independently of others, they often exist. 
Figure 5 – A typical multi-rate system 
 
A means-tested system is said to achieve high ‘target efficiency’, compared with the 
BI/FT, where the main - indeed, only - aim of a transfers system is thought to be the 
avoidance of poverty. However, it raises the problem of adverse labour supply incentives.  
The use of a diagram showing the relationship between net and gross income implied by 
a tax and transfer system is convenient from the point of view of design, such as avoiding 
discontinuities, and can relate to many individuals, as well as making the thresholds and 
rates transparent. However, it has serious limitations as a device for examining labour 
supply incentive effects of taxes. With this in mind, it is necessary to turn to individual 
budget constraints.  
3  Taxes and labour supply 
Labour supply considerations require the use of budget constraints relating net income to 
the number of hours worked, rather than the type of diagram used in the previous section. 
Furthermore, the net/gross income diagram does not distinguish income from earnings 























3.1  The framework of analysis 
The discussion in this section assumes that the individual has a fixed gross wage (though 
there may be an overtime premium) in a single job. Each individual is assumed to 
maximise utility, which is regarded as a function of net income and leisure. An indifference 
map is shown in Figure 6: indifference curves that are further to the north west represent 
higher utility. In this simple static model, although hours of work are considered, 
consumption does not take time, there is no household production and leisure is simply 
enjoyed as time not spent working. The individual trades, at the margin, the disutility 
arising from working an extra hour with the utility obtained from the consumption of the 
resulting net income. 
Figure 6 – An indifference map 
 
Utility is maximised subject to a budget constraint. The concept of the budget constraint 
necessarily applies to single individuals, rather than groups of individuals (though it may 
also apply to individuals with working or non-working partners). This is because each 
budget constraint depends fundamentally on the individual’s wage rate, as well as some 
other characteristics, and is thus unique. A basic requirement of any model designed to 
examine taxes in the presence of labour supply responses is therefore that it is capable of 
producing the budget constraints for all individuals in the data set on which the model is 
constructed.  
3.2  The basic income – flat tax 
Figure 7 shows the budget constraint for an individual under the BI/FT structure, and 
facing a gross wage rate per hour of w. The starting point of the constraint, where hours 
worked equal zero,  0 h = , corresponds to net income at point A. This includes any 
benefits, along with all sources of non-wage income (and if the labour supply decision of 
couples is assumed to involve some kind of joint maximisation process, this may include 



















income obtained from an extra hour of work, and is thus equal to  () 1 wt − , the net wage 
rate. 
Figure 7 – Individual budget constraint: BI/FT 
Figure 8 – Wages and hours worked 
The maximisation of utility, subject to the budget constraint, may therefore lead either to a 
corner solution at A, where the individual does not work, or a tangency solution 
somewhere along AB. Within this framework, the work participation decision is associated 
with movement away from the corner solution. This corner is clearly more likely to be 
chosen, the lower is the gross wage and the higher is the tax rate, since both tend to 
make the constraint flatter.  
Figure 8 shows the effect on labour supply of varying the wage rate. For the relatively low 
wage rate of  1 w ,  the optimal position is at the non-participation corner A on indifference 




























positions on indifference curves U 2  and U 3 respectively. The gross wage is of course not 
transparent in Figure 8, because the slope of the budget line is the net wage. It is 
therefore useful to transfer the information to a separate diagram, the labour supply curve. 
Figure 9 – Labour supply with the BI/FT 
 
The supply curve associated with this linear budget constraint is shown in Figure 9 as 
AAB. As usual in economics, the ‘price’ - here the gross wage - is shown on the vertical 
axis while hours worked are shown on the horizontal axis (although strictly the relevant 
price here is that of leisure, which is reflected in the net rather than the gross wage rate). 
The range AA is associated with the kink point A in Figure 7 and reflects wage rates for 
which the individual remains at the ‘non-participation’ kink. For higher wages, labour 
supply expands along the range AB as this pivots about A. Depending on the individual’s 
preferences, the supply curve may bend ‘backwards’ as shown by the dashed line, which 
may be said to represent the standard elementary ‘text book’ labour supply curve.  
4  Piecewise-linear budget constraints 
This section extends the previous analysis to deal with budget constraints made up of 
several linear segments, each associated with a given marginal tax rate and earnings 
threshold. Such multi-segment constraints are referred to as piecewise-linear budget 
constraints.  
4.1  A convex budget set 
The effect of an increase in the gross wage on a more complex budget constraint is 
shown in Figure 10. The constraint ABC has a kink at B, reflecting the presence of an 



















to be convex: a straight line joining any two points is associated with a feasible position, 
that is a net income less than or equal to the net income along the budget line.  
The earnings threshold is not evident from the budget constraint, unlike the net/gross 
income diagram, since the hours level at which it occurs depends on the wage rate. For a 




, and the kink point B
′
 is to the 
left of B. This is because a lower hours level is required, at the higher wage, to reach the 
earnings threshold where the marginal rate increases; gross and thus net income remain 
constant at the kink. 
Figure 10 – A convex budget set 
Figure 11 – A corner solution 
A corner solution is shown in Figure 11, where the highest indifference curve just touches 
the budget constraint at point B. However, the optimal position for the individual can 
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can be drawn which is tangential to the indifference curve at the kink, B. This generates 
the important concepts of the virtual wage and virtual income. These concepts are taken 
from the theory of rationing, where corner solutions are important, and are particularly 
useful when considering the welfare changes arising from tax reforms. 
Figure 12 – Gross earnings and the wage rate 
 Before considering the labour supply function implied by the budget constraint in Figure 
10, it is useful first to examine the relationship between gross earnings (the product of 
hours worked and the gross wage, that is, wh) and the wage rate. This is shown in Figure 
12. At very low wages, utility maximisation gives rise to the corner solution at A. When the 
wage rate exceeds some level (as the section AB of the constraint pivots about A), the 
individual moves to a tangency position. Increases in the wage induce higher labour 
supply until the gross earnings threshold is reached at which the marginal effective tax 
rate increases. A characteristic of this kind of kink in the budget constraint - where there is 
no tangency solution but a position where the highest indifference curve touches the 
relevant corner - is that the individual ‘sticks’ at the corner for a range of wage rates. In 
this case the gross earnings remain constant as the wage rate rises over a range, 
although of course the associated hours level falls. Eventually, for a sufficiently high wage 
rate, the individual moves to a tangency along the range BC of the constraint. The lengths 
of the flat sections AA and BB, and the nature of the rising sections AB and BC, depend 
on the individual’s preferences. A higher preference for consumption over leisure (flatter 
indifference curves) gives rise to shorter sections AA and BB in Figure 12.  
Individuals may face the same tax rates and thresholds, but the variation in non-wage 
incomes, wage rates and preferences means that each budget constraint and gross 
earnings/wage schedule is unique. However, the existence of the kink may suggest that 
some ‘bunching’ of individuals around the threshold in the distribution of gross earnings. 
This kind of phenomenon is nevertheless only observed in particular cases - a tax 
threshold need not produce a ‘spike’ in the earnings distribution, and modes may in 
practice correspond to tangency solutions. Hence, the distribution of earnings need not 




















Figure 13 – Labour supply curve 
 
The range BB in Figure 12 is associated with a fixed level of earnings, so that wh is 
constant. This implies that, in a graph of hours worked plotted against the wage rate, the 
hours of work would follow a rectangular hyperbola over the relevant range. The labour 
supply function is shown in Figure 13. This property, that the labour supply curve turns 
sharply backwards, following a rectangular hyperbola, as the wage rate increases over a 
range, is entirely general and applies to any kink in the budget constraint associated with 
an increase in the marginal effective tax rate at a threshold level of earnings.  
Two important general lessons emerge from this discussion. First, the number of hours of 
work supplied and the net wage are jointly determined. Second, it makes little sense to 
attempt to describe the labour supply function (hours supplied as a function of the gross 
wage) in terms of a single elasticity. Even if the ranges AB and BC have a constant 
elasticity, large variations occur at the kink points, and of course the elasticity changes 
sign twice.  
4.2  A non-convex budget set 
An example of a budget constraint with a means-tested benefit is given in Figure 14, as 
ABC. The benefit is gradually withdrawn at a relatively high rate until it is exhausted at B, 
when the individual only pays income tax (where integration of the benefit and tax 
systems avoids a discontinuity). Here the budget set is said to be non-convex. This raises 
the possibility of an indifference curve being simultaneously tangential to the two sections 
of the constraint, for a particular wage rate; this is shown in Figure 14 by the two 
tangencies at J and K. A small increase in the wage rate would therefore produce a 

























Figure 14 -- Means-testing: A non-convex budget set 
Figure 15 -- Gross earnings and the wage rate 
 
A discrete jump of this kind is reflected in the relationship between gross earnings and the 
wage rate, shown in Figure 15. When the wage rate is increased, earnings become 
positive after a particular wage has been passed and the individual increases labour 
supply along the range AB. But at a particular wage, the ‘switching’ wage, the individual 
jumps to point K along the range BC in Figure 15. Further increases in the wage produce 
a gradual increase in labour supply along KC. The associated labour supply curve is 
shown in Figure 16, where the vertical jump in Figure 15 translates into a horizontal range 
of the supply curve. There is a range where the individual is working and receiving 
benefits along part of AJ; but this is just a proportion of the hours range over which the 



































Figure 16 – Labour supply curve 
 
 
These properties of the relationship between the shape of the budget constrain and the 
labour supply curve are completely general: a kink in the budget constraint associated 
with a rise in the marginal tax rate is associated with a ‘backward bending’ range along a 
rectangular hyperbola (where gross earnings are constant), and a kink associated with a 
fall in the effective marginal tax rate produces a horizontal range in the supply curve. In 
the first case the kink produces a degree of rigidity (no movement from the ‘travelling’ kink 
as the wage changes), while in the second case the kink produces a discrete jump in 
labour supply. The phenomenon of a jump may suggest that the earnings distribution may 
have a ‘gap’ or antimode - but (as with the other type of kink) the distribution of earnings is 
generated by substantial heterogeneity in wages and preferences, and such a gap may 





















Figure 17 – Corner and tangency solutions 
The existence of means-testing may actually rule out a complete section of the budget line 
from the point of view of labour supply. Such a possibility is shown in Figure 17, where 
instead of two tangency positions, the highest indifference curve is shown to give rise 
simultaneously to a corner solution at A and a tangency at K. Hence the whole range of 
AB is ruled out, as well as the range BK of BC. The relationship between gross earnings 
and the wage is shown in Figure 18 where the ‘switching’ wage produces a jump from 
zero labour supply and thus zero earnings to the point K. This individual would not be 
observed both working and receiving the means-tested benefit, that is, would not be 
among the ‘working poor’. 


































Figure 19 – Fixed costs of working 
 In addition to means testing, a non-convex range of the budget set may arise from the 
existence of fixed costs of working. This is shown in Figure 19, where fixed costs are 
shown as the length AB. Their existence substantially raises the minimum wage above 
which the individual works, and implies that low hours levels are not chosen at all.  
4.3  A multi-rate tax structure 
Figure 20 contains a budget constraint having four marginal tax rates. Means-testing of 
benefits involves an increase in the marginal rate after point B, and a subsequent 
reduction in the marginal rate once benefits have been exhausted at point C. The range 
DE reflects an increase in the marginal income tax rate beyond D. This degree of 
nonlinearity of the budget constraint generates the possibility of multiple local optima on 
different ranges of the constraint. Figure 21 shows a situation where indifference curve U1 
is tangential to the budget constraint along CD, while curve U 2  gives a corner solution at 
point B where higher taper or benefit withdrawal rates start to apply. This does not 
introduce any new principles, but raises complications when modelling labour supply, as 



















Figure 20 – A multi-rate system 







































Figure 22 – Labour supply curve with multi-rate tax system 
 
The labour supply curve resulting from this four-rate tax structure is shown in Figure 22. 
This reflects the general properties obtained above. Hence the two corners B and D of the 
constraint (and the earnings thresholds associated with them) in Figure 20 generate the 
two ranges BB and DD of Figure 22 which involve reductions in labour supply along 
rectangular hyperbolae. The flat section of the supply curve JK is associated with the jump 
from a tangency along BC to a tangency along DC of the budget constraint. The rising 
sections of the supply curve are associated with tangency solutions.  
The supply curve need not necessarily take the precise form shown in Figure 22. 
Consider again the budget constraint shown in Figure 20. The supply curve may involve, 
for a small increase in the wage rate, a jump directly from a corner solution at point B on 
the budget constraint to a tangency along the length CD of the constraint.
3 This is more 
likely to occur, the higher is the benefit withdrawal rate (the flatter the segment AB in 
Figure 20). This alternative is shown in Figure 23. 
                                                                 





























Figure 23 – Alternative labour supply curve 
Figure 24 – Another alternative labour supply curve 
 
Furthermore, it is quite possible that a jump could occur from the kink in the budget 
constraint of Figure 20 at B directly to the kink at D, thereby leaving out the whole of the 
range of the constraint from B to D. The resulting labour supply curve is illustrated in 
Figure 24.  
5 Benefit  take-up 
All the above discussion has made the implicit assumption that there is 100 per cent take-
up of benefits by eligible individuals. However, suppose that there is a non-recoverable 




















































with a single taper rate, combined with an income tax, also imposed at a fixed rate above 
the tax-free threshold corresponding to the earnings level where the benefit is exhausted. 
The basic budget constraint is shown as ABC in Figure 25. The line from the origin to 
point B indicates net wage income, excluding any benefit, although the individual is 
entitled to claim the benefit: hence the slope of B
′
B is equal to the gross wage rate.  
The net income obtained by the individual after claiming the benefit is reduced by the fixed 
cost of claiming, so that the section AB drops down by a vertical distance equal to the cost 




BC. For hours of work 
beyond the point B
′
 the individual is better off by not claiming the benefit because the 
reduced amount of benefit, as a result of means testing, is less than the fixed cost of 
claiming. Hence along the new range B
′
B, the individual neither claims the benefit nor 
earns enough to pay income taxation. The effect is to introduce a further kink in the 
effective budget constraint, in this case arising from the increase in the effective marginal 
tax rate (from zero along B
′
B to the income tax rate as the individual starts to pay income 
tax at B). 






















Figure 26 – Earnings with incomplete take-up 
One possible resulting relationship between gross earnings and the wage rate is shown in 





 to working and not claiming benefits, or paying income tax, along B
′
B. This is 
shown as the jump from J to K in Figure 26. Beyond this point the individual works, until 
reaching the kink where there is an associated horizontal section. There are other 
possibilities. For example, an indifference curve may simultaneously touch points A
′
 and 
B in Figure 26. This means that there is no range where the individual works and receives 
the means-tested benefit; take up is complete at the non-participation corner at A
′
. Or an 




 and touch the corner at 
B. In this case there is also no range where take-up is incomplete, though there is a range 
where the individual works and receives the benefit.  
6 Conclusion 
This paper has illustrated some of the complexities involved in modelling the incentive 
effects of taxes and transfers, using only basic diagrammatic methods of analysis. A wide 
range of labour supply responses are shown to result from highly nonlinear budget 
constraints. A tax or benefit change which improves the labour supply incentives for one 
group of workers, without making them worse off, may at the same time introduce 
disincentives facing another group of workers. Tax policy design inevitably involves 
difficult trade-offs between the desire to avoid labour supply disincentives and the desire 
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